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Political justificationism: a novel contextual epistemology of political disagreement
(Forthcoming in Trames: A Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Special Issue “Disagreements:
from theory to practice”)

Abstract:
The conciliationist and steadfast approaches have dominated the conversation in the epistemology
of disagreement. In this paper I will outline a novel epistemology of political disagreement that
departs from these majority viewpoints. Drawing on Jennifer Lackey’s justificationist approach and
the casuistry paradigm in medical ethics, I will develop a more contextual epistemology of political
disagreement. On this account, a given political disagreement’s scope, domain, genealogy, and
consequence can be helpful for determining whether we should respond to that disagreement at the
level of our confidence, beliefs, or with policy. Though some may argue that responding with policy
is a practical consideration instead of an epistemic matter, I argue that even policy responses to
disagreements have an epistemic dimension to them that we should not ignore.

Keywords: Epistemology of disagreement, political disagreement, casuistry, justificationism,
Jennifer Lackey

Political Justificationism

Political justificationism: a novel contextual epistemology of political disagreement
The epistemology of disagreement literature centers around the issue of epistemic
significance of disagreement: when two people disagree on an issue—especially when they are
epistemic equals or peers with one another—what are they required to do epistemically speaking?
While some, known as steadfasters, claim that one can justifiably maintain one’s belief even in the
face of such disagreement, others, known as conciliationists, argue that one should modify one’s
opinion in light of that disagreement. In contrast with these two approaches, in this paper I will
outline a more particularist approach to political disagreement that follows within Jennifer Lackey’s
justificaitonist approach to disagreement. My proposal, following from the casuistry paradigm in
medical ethics, suggests that paying attention to a given political disagreement’s scope, domain,
genealogy, and consequence can be helpful for determining whether to respond to it at the level of
our confidence, beliefs, or with policy.

1. Lackey and justificationism
Lackey gives the example of two people who disagree what street their favorite restaurant is
on, even though they have both been there with each other several times. She argues that this kind
of situation might not be as epistemically symmetrical as it seems. In these kinds of cases, the
symmetry breaker is that one has personal information that one is functioning normally that one
does not have of the other person. She claims that while one can know that one’s own cognitive
functioning is operating normally, one is not under the effects of any psychotic, memory-altering
drugs, and so on, one cannot be so sure that these things are true of one’s interlocutor. When that
personal information is combined with a highly justified belief, Lackey concludes that
steadfastness—or non-conformism in her terms—is called for (Lackey 2010, 300-301). Conversely,
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though, when one is in a situation where one does not have such a symmetry breaker or one’s belief
is not as justified, then Lackey would recommend a more conciliationist response (Lackey 2012,
106). Lackey’s account contrasts with others because there is no simple, one-size-fits-all approach to
disagreement. How you should respond to a given disagreement—whether to conciliate or not—
depends on which view has the most justification: if the preponderance of justification turns out to
be on the other person’s side, you should conciliate them, but if it happens to be with your beliefs,
you should stick to your original position.
There are some initial issues with her approach. First, it is not clear that it removes the kind
of symmetry that is troublesome with peer disagreements. There could be situations where such
personal information could provide one with reason to trust one’s own faculties over another
person. But in such scenarios, we could easily imagine that the other person would have reason to
make the very same claim; they have personal information that their cognitive faculties are operating
fine, and it is you who is cognitively malfunctioning. If one was a third-party observing this
disagreement, the symmetrical nature of the disagreement would still seem salient. Lackey’s appeal to
personal self-knowledge is especially troublesome in the contexts of political disagreements, where
we know that various forms of unconscious bias and motivated reasoning are rampant, often
unbeknownst to individuals (Hallsson 2018).
Tim Kenyon takes Lackey’s justificationist approach to mean that an epistemology of
disagreement should adopt a more particularist, case-by-case method and less of a general theory.
That might not be the most accurate way of characterizing Lackey’s position—on her view there is a
unitary standard of justification that should be applied in every instance of disagreement. But
nevertheless, Kenyon takes this case-by-case approach to be a more adequate way of approaching
disagreement overall:
“That there is no single privileged answer to the question, ‘What ought we to do,
epistemically speaking, when faced with a disagreement?’ is no more surprising, and certainly no
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bleaker, than the idea that there is no single privileged answer to the question, ‘What ought I to do,
possession-wise, when somebody hands me something? It depends on whether I’m being handed a
cake or a cobra’” (Kenyon 2018, 244).
Kenyon is claiming here that the disagreement literature is misguided into thinking that there
is a universally applicable answer or general formula to what we should do when we disagree. But
when asked “what should we do when we disagree?” an “It depends” is a pretty unsatisfying answer.
Depends on what? I suggest that there are at least four dimensions of political disagreement that are
relevant to what one should do (epistemically speaking) in a given case. While these dimensions are
surely not the only ones worth thinking about, I think they provide some initially plausible
considerations for political disagreements.

2. Dimensions of political disagreements
While political disagreements are going to vary along lots of different dimensions, I will
focus on four: domain, scope, genealogy, and urgency. While there are certainly other dimensions
worthy of consideration, focusing on these will provide a wide array of disagreement-types. For
each dimension, I will also give a prima facie gloss of how differences along these dimensions might
affect the epistemological evaluation of these respective types. To be clear, there are wide
discussions raised in each of these dimensions, and my intention here is not to settle all, or even
most, of these controversies. Rather, my aim is to show why it is reasonable to think that different
disagreement-types may warrant different epistemological evaluations and responses.
2.1 Domain
First, political disagreements differ in their domain: some disagreements are about facts
about the empirical world, while others are about normative claims about what is valuable or how
we ought to act. While treatment of political disagreements has usually centered on normative
disputes —e.g. "What steps should we take to address climate change?” conflicts over factual matters
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—"Is anthropogenic climate change occurring?”—are also becoming increasingly salient in the
current political atmosphere. Though there are good reasons to be skeptical of a firm distinction
between these domains (Douglas 2014, Robert and Zeckhauser 2011), for the moment we can at
treat these as conceptually independent types of disagreement.
Why think that this difference in domain is important for the epistemological questions
surrounding political disagreements? Christopher Robert and Richard Zeckhauser (2011) point out
that where a disagreement is over an empirical matter, one possible solution might be to continue
the investigation, do some additional research, perhaps to put the two clashing views to an empirical
test. For instance, if two people disagree on the empirical question about whether large deficit
government spending produces higher levels of inflation in the near-term future, there are ways of
adjudicating that dispute: one can track how much inflation happens after a recent spate of deficit
spending, or look at historical examples of how much inflation happened after past iterations of high
spending. While these kinds of empirical tests are available for responding to factual disputes, they
are not as readily or directly available to resolving normative ones. For value disagreements that are
not as amenable to empirical testing, Robert and Zeckhauser suggest the only available option
seeking a mutually beneficial compromise of some sort (Robert and Zeckhauser 2011, 2). Of course,
the availability of empirical testing should not lead us to be sanguine that political factual disputes
are likely resolved by simply appealing to such empirical tests. The literature on theoretical
underdetermination suggests that crucial experiments demonstrating one scientific theory to be
rationally preferable to a rival are rare (if they exist at all), as there are always auxiliary hypotheses
that can be utilized to explain away a false prediction (Arabatzis 2008). While such special-pleading is
likely to be prominent in the political domain, it nevertheless remains one way of responding to
more factual political disagreements.

Political Justificationism

7

2.2 Scope
Second, political disagreements differ in their scope. Many disagreements are deep, in the
sense that they are widespread about more than one issue. A staunch libertarian and a democratic
socialist do not just disagree on government’s place in healthcare, but on a wide range of political
issues as well. In the starkest examples, disagreements may go all the way down to differences in
philosophical first principles. Robert Fogelin, took “deep disagreement” to be conflict of
fundamental epistemic principles (Fogelin 2005, 8) though deep disagreements surely also happen at
ethical, ontological, and other philosophical foundations as well. Other disagreements, though, are
more localized in the sense that they take place against a background of general agreement on related
issues. Following with the image of “deep disagreements” we might call these localized
disagreements “shallow.” People who generally agree that universal healthcare coverage is an
important policy goal might still disagree about what kind of single payer or multi-payer system best
implements that vision.
The scope of disagreement plausibly affects how one should respond to it. Several
conciliationists have argued that that the conciliatory requirement diminishes as the scope of a
disagreement widens. Martin Ebeling, has argued that disagreeing with someone who is an epistemic
peer on a political question obligates one to conciliate with them. If upon further inspection,
however, one finds that the disagreement between two people is more widespread than originally
thought, that gives reason to downgrade their status as an epistemic peer (Ebeling 2017, 82). The
opposite is also possible as well: two people who initially think they are far apart on a given matte
may discover after discussion that they are actually agree on a lot more than had realized. On
Ebeling’s view, that realization of a more localized disagreement puts pressure on the two conciliate.
Even if there is reason to disagree with Ebeling about how strong that pressure is in either of these
cases, the point here is that the depth of disagreement does affect how one should respond to that
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disagreement. John Pittard (forthcoming) has also argued that the skeptical force of a disagreement
is weaker for more “fundamental” disagreements that are driven by different epistemic starting
points than in shallower disputes that might take place among peers.
Independent of their relation to shallower disputes, the question of how one should respond
to deep disagreements has spawned its own burgeoning subfield in epistemology. Fogelin himself
was skeptical that there could be a rational resolution to this kind of dispute; the normal
argumentative methods that allow for people to resolve their disagreements rationally are not
available because in such deep disagreements there is not a shared framework—no agreed upon test
or source—from which to resolve the conflict. There has been pushback against this though.
Michael Lynch (2010) has argued that while deep disagreements cannot be resolved epistemically—
since in these kinds of situations one cannot provide a non-question-begging epistemic reason that
would solve the conflict—it can be treated at the level of practical reason. One can give practical
reasons to one’s interlocutor in a kind of epistemic analogue to a Rawlsian veil-of-ignorance
exercise, where each cooperate with each other to come up with reasons for what kind of principles
should be used for privileging some epistemic methods over others (Lynch 2010, 274-5).
2.3 Genealogy
Third, it is plausible to think that political disagreements have different kinds of genealogical
sources, particularly from both rational and irrational sources. Many political disagreements are
caused by one or more irrational biases influencing at least one of the disputants. For instance,
someone who disagrees with the factuality of the Sandy Hook shooting because they rely on a
known to be unreliable source like Alex Jones as their primary source of information are likely
disagreeing irrationally. Other instances of irrationality might be more subtly problematic, in that a
person may hold irrational beliefs but nevertheless ostensibly satisfy epistemic criteria of rational
belief. Endre Begby notes that when prejudicial beliefs are a part of a person’s background beliefs, it
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becomes epistemically rational for those beliefs to control, interpret, and evaluate new evidence and
experiences (Begby 2013, 94). Motivated reasoning is another prominent cause of many political
disagreements. Motivated reasoning describes a bias that skews one’s evaluation of the evidence in
favor of the beliefs that one already holds. Rather than evaluating their beliefs in light of the
available evidence, motivated reasoning causes people to start reasoning from their conclusions they
want to reach and then interpret the available evidence in a way that supports those conclusions.
One famous variant of motivated reasoning is confirmation bias, where people accept at face value
information that confirms their prior political views, while subjecting any disconfirming data to
significantly more scrutiny (Lord et al. 1979). Antecedent political confidence interferes with ability
to interpret statistical data correctly, even among the most highly mathematically literate people
(Kahan et al. 2013). While perhaps less egregiously irrational than the kinds of causes discussed, and
others, it is plausible to think that motivated reasoning still produces irrational forms of
disagreements (Ancell 2017).
Despite the presence of all of these irrational forces on political disagreements, I think it
would be too hasty to claim that all disagreements in this domain are irrational. W.B. Gallie (1956)
argued that some interminable disputes in domains like politics are over what he terms “essentially
contested concepts”: ideas whose application and validity are both not resolvable by rational
argumentation, but “nevertheless sustained by perfectly respectable arguments and evidence” (Gallie
1956, 169). Essentially contested concepts like “democracy” have complex components that are
open for reasonable individuals to interpret and weigh them differently. The essential contestability
of political concepts often invites taking an anti-realist or relativist understanding of the dispute in
question: if there are no uniquely rational or superior way to understand these concepts, then
perhaps there is simply no truth about the matter. This is also too quick, as essentially contested
concepts do not have to be capable of convincing every reasonable person in order for it to be good
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or valuable (Mason 1993, 54). Though he does not engage with the notion of “essentially contested”
concept, Alvin Goldman (2010) has presented a similar account of how reasonable disagreement can
be possible. In a complex domain like politics, discovering one uniquely rational answer to many
conflicting issues might seem implausible. Goldman thinks that norms of inquiry in this kind of
difficult domain are likely to be permissive rather than prescriptive, indicating what range of ideas
are rationally permissible to believe and enact rather than dictating some unique position. For
instance, even if we assume that there is a truth about how to balance autonomy and well-being in
society, there might still be a range of reasonable and justifiable positions that deviate from that
ideal.
More specific to political disagreements John Rawls (2005) has argued for the possibility of
reasonable political disagreements based on what he called the “burdens of judgment.” The relevant
evidence that bears on a dispute issue is often dispersed, not easily accessible, likely open to many
different interpretations, and different ways of balancing competing goals or values. If people are
able to independently use their rational faculties in these situations, Rawls thinks we should expect
that they will likely come to different conclusions. To use the earlier example of well-being and
autonomy, a libertarian and a liberal will likely disagree about how to prioritize one over the other,
not necessarily because one them is being unreasonable or committing a gross error of irrationality,
but because people freely exercising their own rational capacities will not necessarily come to the
same conclusions about how to weight competing values.
Of course, while it might be uncontroversial to say that some political disagreements are
reasonable while others are not, giving a clear and principled demarcation between the two will be
hotly contested. One might think that the demarcation of reasonable and unreasonable is itself a
relative idea: Infowars enthusiasts will likely claim that questions about the Sandy Hook shooting,
Pizzagate, or Barack Obama’s citizenship are at the very least matters of reasonable disagreement.
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Given certain background beliefs, these theories can certainly appear reasonable. Climate change
skeptics will insist that their skepticism about attributing climate change to human activity is a matter
of reasonable disagreement, despite the overwhelming consensus in the opposite direction. Under
what conditions are disagreements reasonable? Christopher McMahon has argued that
disagreements are reasonable just in cases when all of the disputing parties are competent reasoners
who give due consideration to all the relevant factors at play (McMahon 2009, 8-10). On this
account disagreements can be reasonable even if the participants dispute not only what
considerations are relevant but also whether they consider their opponents to be reasonable.1
2.4 Consequence
Finally, some political disagreements are consequential in ways that others are not. Some
disagreements are inconsequential in that nothing hangs on their being resolved. Suppose that you
are discussing with your family members over whether the individual mandate of the Affordable
Care Act is an unconstitutional government overreach or a necessary aspect of sustainable healthcare
policy. If it is like most such discussions, neither person will provide enough reason to sway the
other side; in which case, it seems like the only option is to come to no resolution. And this “agree
to disagree” outcome seems acceptable in part because there are likely no substantial consequences
that result from that lack of resolution. Disagreements in informal settings seem to have this
(relatively speaking) inconsequential character. But when the Supreme Court deliberated over this
very issue of the individual mandate in NFIB v. Sebelius, they likely went over much of the same

1

The claim that a given disagreement is reasonable should be understood in a weak epistemological sense that it
seems to be reasonable, from our vantage point. This is not to say disagreements that are seen as reasonable actually
meet some criteria of reasonableness from an objective, God’s-eye-view perspective, but rather simply that we have
not located the error in reasoning yetHere I am drawing on the analogy of Robert Talisse’s weak epistemological
pluralism that says there value conflicts that do not seem amenable to any kind of rati onal resolution but not necessarily
because of any culpable error on any disputant’s part: whether by failure of rationality, error in judgment, or lack of
knowledge. This epistemological pluralism is agnostic on the deeper question of whether these conflicts are best
explained by an ontological pluralism (Talisse 2011, 24-25).
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evidence and arguments that you and your family members considered, and yet still had staunch
disagreements through their deliberation. But what is different about the Supreme Court’s handling
of this disagreement is that they could not simply “agree to disagree” in the way that you and your
family members did. And the reason is simple: how they settled that question would have far wider
consequences; their decision would have coercive authority on everyone subject to that law. It seems
reasonable, then, to think that when coercive authority is at stake individuals should treat their
disagreements differently than in situations where it is not in play. Andrea Sangiovanni has
succinctly articulated the claim that many political disagreements are distinctive in that they make
claim to the use of political authority: political disagreements are “not merely about which party is
epistemically justified…but which party is politically justified in laying claim to the armature of political
authority … that shapes basic constraints and opportunities” (Sangiovanni 2008, 157).
Coercive power is also at play in many formal legislative disagreements, so the stakes it
reasonable to think the stakes are similarly elevated there as well. It seems reasonable to think in
deliberations where coercion is in play that more justification is required than there are in lowerstakes discussions of the same issue. The presence of coercive power in formal legislative and
judicial contexts therefore plausibly encroaches on how one should respond to that disagreement in
those high-stakes situations. The encroachment of coercion on certain political disagreements
connects with a prominent theme in contemporary analytic epistemology known as pragmatic
encroachment (Stanley 2005, Fantl and McGrath 2012). Christopher Hookway has articulated a
similar notion of encroachment the explicitly draws out an epistemic relevance of practical concerns,
namely in when we are justified in gathering more evidence and data or going forward with acting on
the available evidence: “the greater the disaster if our actions fail to achieve their purpose, the more
evidence we require before we regard the belief as properly justified; the greater the risks attaching
to inaction, the readier we are to act on limited evidence (Hookway 1990, 139).
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The primary argument for pragmatic encroachment relies on consideration of cases that are
identical in their epistemic or evidential properties but differ in their practical or moral properties.
Suppose I remember that my car is parked on the street around the corner from my house in a spot
I have parked in before. It seems reasonable to say in this instance that I know that my car is legally
parked. Call this the low-stakes case. But street sweeping signs go up fairly regularly without my
awareness of them, so it is possible that my car is parked illegally on this particular day. Suppose
there is a report that local police are going to start writing large punitive tickets to cars parked on
streets during their street cleaning days. In this high-stakes case, even though my epistemic reasons
about whether my car is legally parked have not changed from the low-stakes scenario, it seems
reasonable to say I am not as justified in believing that my car is legally parked.
But even if practical considerations do encroach on our beliefs, why think that coercion
should be one such practical consideration when it comes to certain political disagreements?
Suppose that I have strong justification to believe it is ethically wrong to eat meat and therefore I
should adopt a vegetarian diet and lifestyle. I might believe that if other competent moral reasoners
considered the relevant factors about this issue, they would come to agree with me, and that the
world would be better off if everyone converted to this way of life. But suppose I transposed these
ethical beliefs about eating meat into the political domain, say that the state or government should
prevent people from consuming meat, perhaps even banning or significantly curtailing meat
manufacturing. Even if we granted the truth of this ethical belief, that would not necessarily justify
this parallel political belief. Part of what distinguishes political beliefs from evaluative claims like
ethical ones is that the former are aimed at giving us normative instructions of how we ought to
cooperate with each other, in particular what should be prevented or allowed. Gerald Gaus notes
that what distinguishes political and social morality from ethical concerns about a good life is that
the former is a “set of social-moral rules…that we direct to each other to engage in, or refrain from,
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certain lines of conduct” (Gaus 2011, 2). Political and social morality thus inherently claims authority
over others, how people are allowed or prohibited from interacting with each other, in a way that
strictly speaking ethical concerns do not. When a disagreement gets transposed into a situation
involving coercion, it elevates the stakes of the situation, as the people subject to the coercive policy
would justifiably require a reason, one that they would not be warranted in asking for otherwise.
Believing this in the ethical domain does not necessarily commit me to the further political claim
that the state is warranted in preventing people from believing and acting differently than I do on
this matter. When political attitudes have this coercive element to them, it is reasonable to think that
this elevates the stakes of what kind of justification is necessary for them to be acceptable.
This request for higher levels of justification in the context of political morality is often cast
as an issue of moral justification, but I think an epistemic aspect is operative as well. Thomas Nagel
(1987) has argued for an epistemological division between the public and the private sphere, that we
have to seek a higher level of justification for coercive political actions than we do for ordinary
moral beliefs: “…in certain contexts I am constrained to consider my beliefs merely as beliefs rather
than as truths, however convinced I may be that they are true, and that I know it” (Nagel 1987, 230).
On his account, we do not have to stop thinking that our beliefs are true or justified according to
our own epistemological perspective, only that from the political perspective they are required to
meet some more impartial justification. A related epistemic consideration is that the justifications
provided have to be acceptable in some sense2 to those who ask for it. As Fabienne Peter puts it, if a
policy is to be politically justified it must be justified to the citizens who are subject to it (Peter 2018).
If there is no accessible reason available to them to accept some political decision, then we have
some good reason to think that decision is not politically justified. It might be the case that they

Of course, much of this claim hinges not on what actual individuals—who may be irrational, ignorant, or subject to
some kind of cognitive bias—but rather what some idealized rational individuals would find acceptable. There is much
discussion on what degree of idealization is necessary for this kind of justification (See Vallier 2014, ch. 5).
2
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would be persuaded by the same reasons that convinced me, but it is highly unlikely that everyone
would buy into those reasons that I find acceptable, chiefly because reasonable disagreement likely
obtains in even the most idealized scenario. In the meat-eating example given above, it is more
plausible that many reasonable people would differ in their assessment of that the ethics of eating
meat and thus not come to the same conclusion as I do.
But while I think the pragmatic encroachment theorists are correct to posit a relationship
between the epistemic and practical states, there is a sense in which it is too close for the purposes
of political disagreement. One way of motivating the pragmatic encroachment thesis is by positing a
connection between an epistemic state and a practical action Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath
call the Knowledge-Action thesis: if a person knows that p, then she is justified in acting on the
basis that p (Fantl and McGrath 2002, 72). This seems too strong of a connection in the political
context, as the meat-eating example demonstrates: there can be beliefs that one can have
justification for believing without thinking they rise to the level of justification required to use in the
public sphere.
In surveying these four dimensions, a given disagreement will fall somewhere along each of
these dimensions. Thus, there will be deep, irrational, consequential disagreements over facts, as well
as narrow, reasonable, non-consequential normative disagreements, and all the combinations in
between.

3. Responding to disagreements: levels
Responding to a disagreement can take place at three distinct levels: confidence, beliefs, and
policy. They could take place at the level of credences or confidence. Take the case of Joan and Jane
who disagree on the justice of legally permitting abortions. While they each have divergent credences
on the question of the justice of abortion of .2 and .8, respectively, after discussion with each other,
they become less confident in their original position, and therefore downgrade their respective
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credences to .3 and .7. We can also talk about the confidence level in less formal terms of going
from more to less confident in one’s position in light of a disagreement. There is no presumption
that credence-conciliation would require any significant alteration to either one’s beliefs or their
justifications for them. Nathan Ballantyne (2013) provides one example where such a credenceresponse is motivated without any substantial alteration to a person’s beliefs themselves. He argues
that, for any finished project one writes, it is highly likely that there is a fatal flaw or defeater in its
argument. A more perceptive philosopher like Elizabeth Anscombe would likely notice that error if
they examined it, but since they are not alive to point out that error, the author is currently unaware
of. Ballantyne thinks this counterfactual operating as a weak defeater motivates some mild form of
intellectually humility that should make us less confident in our beliefs without seriously altering our
beliefs themselves. The empirical research on how much people overestimate their own skills and
competency may even support the more radical claim that disagreement (at least with one’s
epistemic equals) should make a person weakly confident that they themselves are wrong (Wiland
2016).
We could also respond at the level of the content of our beliefs. Martin Ebeling gives the
example of three legislators (A, B, C) who are deliberating on what the top tax rate should be: A says
40%, B 50%, C 60%. If A, B, C are peers with each other (i.e. agree on all the factual and normative
issues related to this question), then Ebeling thinks the uniquely rational thing for them to do is
“achieve full epistemic conciliation” with each other, in this case at 50% (Ebeling 2017, 173).
Though adjusting one’s confidence does not necessarily require any alterations of one’s beliefs, often
they are related: it is difficult to imagine a substantial shift in one’s confidence without some
attendant alteration in one’s beliefs. If someone provides you with a previously unconsidered
argument or reason to think one’s beliefs are false, that will often result in one becoming less
confident in those beliefs. One could also include in this level of conciliation the modification of
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reasons and justification as part of the content of the belief, where one is incorporating those new
justifications into one’s belief structure.
Finally, we can respond at the level of a plan or policy. On this level, we are not adjusting
our beliefs or confidence in them; instead, we are agreeing on a plan or policy that in some way
accommodates (at least some of) the representative viewpoints. Policy-level resolutions often take
the form of a compromise, where the disagreeing parties make some kind of concessions of their
ideal position in order to come to agreement with their opponent. Similarly, Fabian Wendt notes
“…what is distinctive about compromises is that all parties regard some other arrangement–not the
one agreed upon–as the optimal solution…” (Wendt 2016, 14).
What is the relationship between these three levels? There is a significant literature on the
general relationship between beliefs and credences (Jackson 2018), whether one is reducible to the
other or whether they are distinct entities that play different roles in our epistemic and cognitive
lives. Following Wendt, I would say these levels of responses are conceptually independent of each
other: while becoming less confident in one’s beliefs might at some point motivate making some
significant modifications of one’s first order beliefs, that connection is not necessary. Similarly,
modifying at the policy level does not necessarily require substantial revision at the level of one’s
beliefs or confidence.

3.1. Epistemic legitimacy of compromises
While there can be many different kinds of policies to respond to disagreement, one of the
most natural form that comes to mind is a compromise, where two opposing sides come to an
agreement with each other. We can ask several questions about the epistemology of political
compromises. First, how does a compromise on policy differ from mere bargaining that is part and
parcel of the normal operations of politics? The concern about mere compromise is that this creates a
kind of modus vivendi agreement. Rawls (2005) speaks of a modus vivendi as an agreement wherein two
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parties resolve a conflict only out of pursuit of their own interests. They do not come to terms
because they have converged on some justification that all parties find acceptable but because they
are not able to pursue their own interests or achieve their own ideological goals in any other way. I
suggest that there can be compromises are an epistemic kind of modus vivendi, where there are no
epistemic reasons to justify it, but only practical ones. Second, as described above by Lister (2007)
and Wendt (2016), compromises are epistemically peculiar because they are by their very nature
viewed as the second-best option. One might wonder about what kind of epistemic justification
these second-best compromises have. There are often practical or strategic reasons that motivate
adopting various compromises—as they can build coalitions across political divisions that are more
likely to pass. In fact, Simon Cabuela May (2005) argues against the very idea of a principled
compromise in a political disagreement independent of pratical reasons. May argues that moral
considerations like respect for persons and mutual reciprocity are an insufficient basis for adopting a
compromise; on his view, there are no reasons to pursue a principled compromise apart from
practical concerns—e.g. that it keeps the peace or the current distribution of power makes it unlikely
that she can realize any of her goals without modifying one’s position.3 One might wonder if a
similar argument applies to epistemic disagreements, that epistemic compromises are only justified if
there are strategic or practical reasons for it.
There are several compelling responses to the epistemic equivalent of May’s argument.
Federico Zuolo and Giula Bistagnino (2018) argue that a compromise can be epistemically
motivated by recognizing the other party as an epistemic peer, as someone with whom one is on a
par with epistemically speaking. In a similar vein, Klemmens Kappel (2018) has argued that while
some political disagreements can give a reason to reduce at least some confidence in one’s own

May allows for pursuing compromises provided that that they “morally acceptable”, that is, do not result in a moral
loss or violate any fundamental moral principle (May 2005, 322-3).
3
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beliefs, it does not necessarily warrant large scale revision (or abandonment) of one’s original
stance.4 While these responses are helpful, I think there is more we can say about the epistemic
justification of compromises. The alternative to an epistemic modus vivendi I have in mind here is that
the agreement they eventually come to should meet some kind of epistemic criteria, more specifically
a notion of epistemic kind of legitimacy.
What might this kind of epistemic legitimacy look like? Epistemic legitimacy can be located
in two different sources: in the final outcomes or decisions that a political body generates or in the
procedures by which the body comes to its decisions. This first source would be a kind of
substantial legitimacy: an agreement A is epistemically legitimate only if all parties to it can locate a
reason in their set of beliefs that would make A acceptable to them. The second source is a
procedural kind of legitimacy, where the source is legitimate because it was produced by an
epistemically fair procedure. Fabienne Peter points out that these sources of legitimacy are not
mutually exclusive, as one can have a substantive (or “rational”) proceduralism that combines both
sources as conditions of epistemic legitimacy: a compromise must be rationally justified as well as
decided by an epistemically fair procedure (Peter 2007, 338-339). David Estlund (2009) has defended
this kind of hybrid position he calls epistemic proceduralism on the grounds that, if his account is
correct, it shows that democratically fair procedures are not just good in themselves but also serve
one of the central epistemic goals of achieving true beliefs. One might worry, though, that looking
for compromises that are epistemically legitimate in Estlund’s substantial sense is unrealistic, as it
would require more agreement than we could expect to get in a situation where resorts to a
compromise decision. In fact, since participants will likely view their original pre-compromise

Regarding May’s point about the necessity of practical reasons for compromises, it is fair to consider the epistemic risk at
play in responding to political disagreements (Aikin et al. 2010)
4
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position as more fully true than the compromise itself, requiring agreement that the end decision is
the truest option seems implausible.
I think the more purely proceduralist account developed by Peter would be more realistic
account of legitimacy in situations where epistemic compromises are usually called for. One can find
a policy outcome unacceptable in its content, while still thinking that it is acceptable because the
procedure by which it was decided is acceptable. Following her account of pure epistemic
proceduralism, what is required for compromises to be legitimate is not only that all parties to the
dispute can participate in the deliberation and decision-making process under conditions of political
and epistemic fairness, that but also that all are also able to “regulate public deliberation at the factgathering and analysis stages” (Peter 2007, 343-4). Furthermore, one can see these kinds of
democratic procedure as themselves compromises: Aurelia Bardon (2018) has argued that
procedures and processes for making political decisions are themselves best viewed as epistemic
compromises that do not have to be acceptable as a more comprehensive epistemology. For
instance, suppose one is a religious person who believes that revelation is a vitally important
epistemic source for one’s beliefs about God and the world, but one is considering a set of rules and
procedures that do not permit revelation as a valid source of evidence in its proceedings. On
Bardon’s view, it is not inconsistent for this religious person to affirm this public epistemology as
acceptable in the public sphere while rejecting it as a satisfactory epistemology outside of that limited
scope. As long as everyone agrees that these kinds of procedures are acceptable for use in deciding
public or political questions, they can reject these procedures in favor of a more expansive
epistemology to answer comprehensive questions that fall outside of the public sphere.

3.2. Justificationism revisited
To connect this discussion of political disagreements to Lackey’s justificationism, there are
several reasons to think that the different political disagreements outlined above present a problem
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for her view. Lackey’s view is that our response to a disagreement should be anchored by where the
balance of justification happens to lie. First, answering Lackey’s specific question about where the
balance of epistemic justification lies requires answering at least some of these questions like “how
much justification do we need?”: is it a factual disagreement or normative one, is it consequential or
not, etc? How one should respond to a disagreement might vary based on whether the disagreement
is over facts or norms, deep or shallow, rational or irrational. In one sense, that is not necessarily an
insurmountable obstacle: determining where the balance of justification in a given case likely
includes these kinds of elements. For Lackeyan justificationsim, at the very least one has to conceive
of epistemic justification in a broader sense than epistemologists have traditionally conceived it. In
this expanded conception of justification, as argued earlier, pragmatic considerations like coercion in
particularly high-stakes legislative or judicial disputes can become epistemic reasons of sort that can
motivate us to respond to a disagreement in a way that we would not in lower-stakes situations.

3.3. Political justificationism
If Lackey’s justificationism is insufficient on its own to confront these different kinds of
disagreements, can we improve upon it? I think so. I will call this development “political
justificationism.” This view is the claim that what one should do in a given disagreement depends
on what kind of disagreement it is, where it falls along the dimensions of its domain, scope,
genealogy, and urgency. There are also three general independent levels at which one can respond to
a policy disagreement: confidence, beliefs, and policy.

4.1. Problems for political justificationism
At this level of generality, though, political justificationism might seem rather thin and
uninteresting. Can we say anything more specific about how one should respond to certain kinds of
disagreements, or even at what level response they should receive? On political justificationism,
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there are a multitude of different kinds of political disagreements as well as several different levels at
which one could respond to them. One might hope that the above discussion could render a
comprehensive account of political disagreement, to the degree that one can say “If you’re having
Type X kind of political disagreement, you should respond in direction Y at level Z.” In the
following two sections, I want to lay out two reasons to be skeptical that construing political
justificationism as this kind of generalist epistemology of political disagreement is plausible. This
pessimistic attitude is motivated, first, by how many different kinds of disagreement there are. While
I think the diversity detailed in 2.2 is a virtue for political justificationism, it is not a comprehensive
account. Political justificationism presents a complex menagerie of disagreements, but it must be
noted that these dimensions still elide numerous further complications and nuances that we find
when we examine individual cases. The nuances of these specific disagreements could plausibly
affect how we should respond to them.
Take the domain dimension distinguishing disagreements over facts and norms. Facts can
obviously vary based on what part of the world they are trying to describe or explain. Some facts are
in static domains with relatively little variance, like soil inspectors and Southern California
meteorologists, while others are in ones that are dynamic and have high volatility, like stock brokers
and parole officers. While expert opinion tends to coalesce in the former domains, they tend to
diverge (sometimes wildly) in the latter ones (Shanteau 2015). Politically relevant facts are thus likely
just as variable in this respect. But what would follow epistemically from the claim that we fewer
disagreements arise in the former domains than in the latter ones? Should we characterize
disagreements in discordant domains as more reasonable than those where convergence more
regularly happens? Such a sweeping claim seems presumptuous to make from the philosophical
armchair.
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Furthermore, factual and value disagreements are themselves often so closely intertwined it
is often difficult to pinpoint where a particular disagreement is on the domain spectrum.
Disagreement about whether life begins at conception might appear to be factual dispute related to
abortion, but, even if it is a factual question, it often spills over into more value-laden conflict over
the value of a woman’s autonomy vs life of a fetus, the interpretation and relevance of sacred
scriptures, and so on. Abortion more generally is a case where certain facts (e.g. fetal development)
are deemed morally relevant by one side of the argument but not the other (Luker 1984).
Adjudicating the reasonableness of abortion disagreement may require determining the
reasonableness of those more specific disputes.
Further nuances arise when we consider the scope dimension more closely. All deep
disagreements are also not all deserving of the same kind of response. Some deep disagreement are
the result of belief polarization, where individuals become more extreme in their attitudes. It is a
common assumption that belief polarization is generally epistemically undesirable, perhaps even
irrational. For instance, Thomas Kelly (2008) has argued that the presence of belief polarization in
our beliefs should give us pause about how confident we are in them. But we should be wary of
taking the epistemic undesirability of these kinds of deepening disagreement as a general principle.
There are some empirical instances (Lindell et al 2017) of deepening disagreement in deliberative
forums that do not seem to have many of the epistemic defects that are normally ascribed to
polarizing beliefs. There are also lots of complexities along the urgency dimension as well. While
disagreements over an annual budget might be urgent in some important sense, they are likely not as
exigent as disagreements over a human right legislation. The differences even within tokens of the
same type of disagreement make me skeptical that they warrant the same kind of response.
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5.1. Casuistical epistemology
I think what follows from this diversity of political disagreements make it difficult, if not
impossible, to expect a general epistemology of political disagreements from the philosophical
armchair. If there is an account that can do justice to the diversity of these disagreements—both
between the different types and also tokens of the same type—it may depend on the particular
features of the context in which the disagreement takes place. Luckily, we have a model for this kind
of reasoning from the casuistry tradition in bioethics (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988, Jonsen 1995, Arras
1991) is skeptical of starting with abstract general moral principles to decide what to do in medical
decisions. On the generalist view they oppose, making ethical decisions involves starting from
universally applicable moral principles, and then applying them in particular circumstances.
Practitioners of casuistry, or casuists, argue that this generalist top-down methodology is too
Figure A
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insensitive to the nuances of cases. They instead favor evaluating situations on a more case-by-case
basis. When evaluating what to do in a given situation, they begin with a thorough description of the
features of a case. Albert Jonsen, Mark Siegler, and William Winslade (2006) have developed a fourbox analysis (see Figure A) that conceptualizes the relevant aspects of a medical case in terms of
medical conditions, quality of life, patient autonomy, and contextual features: given a patient’s
condition, how can she be benefitted or not harmed? What is her quality of life likely to be? Is she
capable of making fully informed choice about her situation? Is that right being respected? What
outcome is fair and just to all parties involved? Are there any conflicts of interests? Clearly laying out
the details of the circumstances are usually illuminating about what kind of case it is: a patient’s mild
dementia that has diminished her capacity to make a rational decision about her care means the case
should be classified as one involving compromised autonomy. Casuists then look to prior cases or
paradigm cases of this type and what decisions were made in those cases (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988,
35). These prior cases serve as precedents that give a provisional conclusion about what should be
done in the present case. Finally, casuists examine the analogies and disanalogies between the
present situation and those prior cases, and then reflect how any peculiar or exceptional
circumstances might warrant a different evaluation than the provisional conclusion (Miller 1996, 5).
While general moral principles like autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice can
certainly play a role in these kinds of deliberations (see Jonsen 1995) casuistry relies more heavily on
reasoning by analogy to decide what should be done.

5.2 Political justificationism: a particularist epistemology of political disagreement
Following the four-box method from casuistical medical ethics, I propose a similar four-box
method (displayed in Figure B) for analyzing political disagreement. While it might be difficult to
provide many broad principles how to deal with the complex types outlined in Figure 1, I will sketch
out how political justificationism’s analysis might be helpful. Let us examine a case of disagreements
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Domain
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Scope

What is the disagreement about?
How persistent is disagreement in
this domain?
Does this disagreement involve any
observational predictions?
What kind of evidence bears on this
disagreement?
Genealogy

•

What is the source of the
disagreement?
Under what circumstances did this
disagreement arise?
What biases are being manifested by
participants in this disagreement?
Are there any identifiable cognitive
biases that are influencing either
party to the dispute?

•

•
•

How widespread is the
disagreement?
What are the places where evidence
is not shared?
In what sense are the disputants
epistemic peers, if at all?
Urgency

•
•
•

Does this disagreement need to be
resolved?
Are there any likely consequences to
a failure to agree?
Are there any likely consequences by
coming to an agreement too quickly?
If a disagreement is urgent, what sort
of features does it need to have?

that are deep and reasonable. Let us consider Jane and Joan’s disagreement about the justice of
legalized abortion mentioned in chapter 1. Take p to be “Legalized abortion is morally just.”
Suppose Jane holds a credence of .8 for p, while Joan holds a credence of .2 for p. After they learn of
their disagreement—as well as discussing their reasons for their

Figure B

respective positions—they decide they are peers on this issue and that they should weakly defer to
each other to account for the possibility of their own cognitive biases and limitations. They therefore
downgrade their respective credences to .7 and .3. They both exchange their reasons for their
respective beliefs, and neither is able to provide a decisive reason that the other person accepts. I
think it is plausible to say that in this situation a “agree to disagree” steadfast is a defeasibly
permissible response. What justifies this claim? Since no decisive defeater was presented for either
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side, modifying their first-order beliefs seems unwarranted in this case. Even to the extent that a
conciliatory modification in warranted, it would be at most a slight change at the level of confidence.
And nothing hinges on their failure to agree; they are not deciding abortion policy or ruling on an
important legal case about abortion, so I see no need for them to substantially revise their position
or come to agreement with each other on this matter. Of course, these judgments are all defeasible,
as not all disagreements about abortion are as reasonable as this very abstractly sketched example. It
is possible that a defeater was provided by Jane or Joan that the other person should have
recognized but failed to. If it came out that either Jane’s or Joan’s views were founded on inaccurate
or misleading information or that one (or both) of their attitudes were being influenced by some
cognitive biases that would provide some reason for them to modify their beliefs (or at least their
confidence in them) to some extent.
Another example of how this four-box method would evaluate a specific case, specifically
the Finnish deliberative poll on immigration discussed by Marina Lindell and co-authors (2017). In
this study research subjects in Turku, Finland debated the highly charged topic of immigration. The
researchers wanted to compare the differences between those who deliberate in like-minded groups
and those who are in more heterogeneous groups. Based on previous research, it was expected that
the participants in like-minded groups would engage in more polarization than the heterogeneous
group. Based on a survey of their initial attitudes on immigration coming into the deliberation, they
were then randomly allocated to like-minded groups, heterogenous groups, or a control group. In
this study, participants who polarized their opinions did not display many of the features that
ordinarily make polarization problematic from a normative standpoint: they formed their beliefs in
heterogenous groups—so there was very little possibility for a groupthink dynamic—and showed
normal levels of information absorption and learning (Lindell et al. 2017, p. 39). One might expect
those who moderated their position post-deliberation would be the ones who learn more, display
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more empathy, and become more open-minded. But in this case, the polarizers displayed many of
the same behaviors and dispositions as those who moderated their opinion (Lindell et al. 2017, p.
40). One possible explanation of this is that the participants were exhibiting preference clarification,
where as a result of deliberation and discussion individuals come to have a clearer, more reflective
understanding of what their actual commitments are. Preference clarification may sometimes result
in convergence and moderation of opinions, but it may also result in polarization. The authors
conclude that we should not assume that polarization as a result of preference clarification is
necessarily bad, epistemically speaking.
How would the four-box method approach this case? At the descriptive level they engage in
polarization. Is that attitude shift epistemically justified? The first thing that stands out here is the
apparent absence of epistemically undesirable biases or forces: there was not any obvious group
effects or individual biases that were influencing people in epistemically problematic ways. Regarding
urgency, they are not policy-makers crafting immigration policy so there are no implications from
them failing to agree. They are also not coming together to make a collective conclusion or decision
either. One might wonder, though, about the long-term effects of such further polarization; while
the clarification of their preferences might be worthwhile and desirable epistemic achievement in
isolation, one could be concerned about how that development might affect their subsequent
interactions. While there are obviously moral components to this concern—e.g. whether they treat
people they disagree with respectfully—there are also epistemic parts to this as well: will this
polarization incline them to further retreat into ideological informational silos that entrench their
views and make them less open to hearing the other side, or less likely to see those they disagree
with as reasonable?
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6. Conclusion
I began with the aim of developing a more adequate epistemology of political disagreement,
specifically through Lackey’s justificationist approach. I have argued that what follows from this
approach is that there is neither one kind of political disagreement, nor even one level at we can
respond to them. While these points might seem rather banal, I think the importance of noticing the
diversities here illustrates the difficulty in developing a generalist approach to political disagreement
that seems to be the default assumption in much discussion of epistemology of disagreement. The
alternative I have sketched out here suggests that figuring out how to properly respond to political
disagreement is likely going to require paying attention to the fine-grained details of its type and its
circumstances and then a good deal of deliberation (internally but interpersonally) about which level
of response—confidence, content, or policy—is warranted.
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